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Understanding how 
individuals perceive the 
economy is instrumental 
to policymakers’ efforts to 
achieve output and price 
stabilization objectives.
Between Internet news sources, social media and email, people are 
awash in information, most of it accessible at near-zero cost. Yet, humans 
possess only a finite capacity to process all of it. The average email user, 
for example, receives dozens of messages per day. The messages can’t all 
receive equal attention. How carefully does someone read an email from 
a sibling or friend before crafting a reply? How closely does a person read 
an email from the boss? 
Limitations on the ability to process information force people to make 
choices regarding the subjects to which they pay more or less attention. 
Economists  have  long  acknowledged  the  existence  of  human  cogni-
tive  capacities,  but  only  in  recent  years  have  models  embodying  such 
limits known as “rational inattention” found their way into mainstream 
macroeconomics. 
Rational inattention models have a broad range of applications. They 
may reconcile relatively unchanged prices and volatile ones and how the 
two play out in aggregate demand in the U.S. economy. Moreover, such 
models  can  capture  salient  features  of  the  business  cycle,  providing  a 
rationale for sharp contractions or slower expansions. Finally, rational inat-
tention models have significant implications for monetary policy. Since the 
focus of these models revolves around formation of peoples’ expectations, 
understanding how individuals perceive the economy is instrumental to 
policymakers’ efforts to achieve output and price stabilization objectives. 
Rational Inattention: A Primer
One macroeconomic school of thought—known as rational expec-
tations—assumes  that  people  fully  and  quickly  process  all  freely  avail- 
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able information. By comparison, 
under rational inattention theory, infor-
mation is also fully and freely avail-
able, but people lack the capability 
to quickly absorb it all and translate 
it into decisions. Rational inattention 
is based on a simple observation: 
Attention is a scarce resource and, as 
such, it must be budgeted wisely.1
A world with overwhelming 
amounts of facts and data means prior-
itizing activities, recognizing individual 
processing limitations and accepting 
the consequences when acting, even 
if all information isn’t fully analyzed. 
Given a physical constraint on the rate 
at which people can process informa-
tion—referred to as Shannon’s chan-
nel, after Claude Shannon, a Bell Labs 
researcher who pioneered information 
theory in the 1940s—people choose 
how much attention to devote to dif-
ferent subjects so they can maximize 
their productivity.
This seemingly abstract concept 
has a familiar resonance with day-
to-day experience. For instance, the 
maximum amount of information 
that somebody can download from a 
computer at any one moment cannot 
exceed a number—the transmission 
rate—provided by the manufacturer. 
Likewise, a person cannot instanta-
neously respond to a given email. 
The amount of time it takes to answer 
email depends on its content and 
how much information that person 
wants to process to produce a sensible 
reply. The brain, which has limits on 
its processing abilities, is the channel 
through which an individual directs 
information, from the original email to 
the reply.
Incorporating such limits intro-
duces great complexity into economic 
models. Still, economists are making 
progress, and results from this new 
avenue of research can explain several 
important aspects of macroeconomic 
performance. For instance, consider 
the business cycle, the period of 
activity between booms and busts. 
Data tell us that in aggregate, output 
contractions are faster than output 
growth during a typical cycle. Yet, 
mainstream models, whose intrinsically 
symmetric structure tends to make 
business expansion and contraction 
roughly equal, cannot account for this 
characteristic. 
Rational inattention theory also 
allows richer modeling that does 
not assume a symmetry of reactions 
to positive or negative economic 
shocks—an unanticipated beneficial 
boost in technology or an unexpected 
oil price increase doesn’t produce the 
same pattern of reactions.
Moreover, rational inattention 
models carry far-reaching policy impli-
cations. The underlying theory aims 
to provide a solid structure to study 
economic expectations as well as the 
public’s reaction to change. If central 
banks successfully reconcile the two, 
they can more effectively communicate 
strategies and goals, thus achieving 
policy objectives.
Choosing How to Consume
Data show that individuals react 
more quickly and strongly to loss of 
wealth than to an enhanced finan-
cial condition. The overall economy 
reduces output in response to a 
negative shock more rapidly than it 
boosts production in the presence of 
positive developments of the same 
significance.2  
Rational inattention provides a 
possible reason for such behavior. 
Individuals choose bits of information 
according to their interests; risk aver-
sion may induce people to process 
negative news faster than positive 
news. As an example, suppose some-
one reads in the news that interest 
rates are falling and businesses are 
cutting budgets. An interest-rate reduc-
tion doesn’t generally prompt people 
to rush to the bank to obtain a loan 
so they can consume instantaneously. 
However, news that companies are 
cutting expenses, possibly including 
worker pay, might encourage individu-
als to more readily seek clarification 
about their job situation and start mak-
ing savings plans. Such behavioral dif-
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ferences are an example of an asym-
metric response to an economic shock 
involving consumption and income.
Rational inattention theory pro-
duces both micro- and macroeconomic 
dynamics—individual decision making 
and broader aggregate behaviors—
observationally distinct from standard 
models.3 These attributes have moti-
vated new research into developing 
models that make sufficiently specific 
predictions that can be compared with 
actual data for individual and group 
actions.4
Making Labor Choices
The relationship between Shannon 
channel information processing con-
straints and the human brain’s capac-
ity suggests how rational inattention 
may be useful for economic modeling. 
Consider a person who must decide 
how much to consume and work 
while facing uncertainty about wages. 
Choosing the appropriate amounts 
and kinds of labor and consumption 
requires paying attention to current 
and future savings as well as various 
ways of earning income from one’s 
work. Information-processing con-
straints come into play, limiting the 
number of combinations the person 
would realistically evaluate. Applying 
rational inattention to this situation 
provides a useful framework for how 
the task will be undertaken. 
For example, the theory’s pre-
dictions are consistent with busi-
ness cycles and secular trends in the 
U.S.—consumption is more changeable 
than the number of hours worked.5 
People are more likely to modify how 
much they save than the amount of 
time worked, a behavior corroborated 
by data.6 Moreover, a group of such 
behaviors, which may greatly vary 
among individuals, can be much less 
volatile when taken together in the 
aggregate.
Selling Low, Buying High
Why are items on sale always 
noticeable at the supermarket, while 
price increases get much less visibility? 
Rational inattention models suggest 
that stores have an interest in attracting 
the attention of the customer to tem-
porary price cuts to increase demand 
in the hope that the merchants can 
maintain consumption when the items 
go back to full price and the discount 
fades. Models of price-setting are 
designed to generate price and wage 
rigidity—the notion that goods prices 
and salary are fixed for a long time.
Rational inattention not only 
accomplishes this, but also explains 
which types of prices are most likely 
to remain rigid. Moreover, the theory 
can account for an important feature 
shared by many grocery store prices: 
frequent temporary discounting that 
reverts to a relatively stable price not 
prone to change outside of the “sale” 
periods.7
Consider the price-setting of a 
monopolistic producer who pays lim-
ited attention to demand. Importantly, 
the price paths drawn from such mod-
els are consistent in ways that rational 
expectation models are not. For exam-
ple, under rational inattention, produc-
ers’ responses to input shocks, such as 
a supply disruption, are delayed and 
gradual; prices are rigid through time, 
and when changes occur, they are 
significant. Pricing is asymmetric, with 
sales (low prices) advertised to pique 
customer interest while diverting atten-
tion from price increases. 
Computational complexity pre-
vents the building of a rational inat-
tention model that could explain a 
marketplace in pricing equilibrium, 
the point at which sellers can attract 
buyers to purchase all that they have 
produced. However, the literature has 
produced one example in which both 
consumers and producers have limited 
capacity to process information about 
prices.8
In that model, sellers produce a 
range of similar goods and compete 
perfectly for shares of the market, 
while consumers decide what bundle 
of goods to buy and where to shop. 
An unanticipated technology change 
affecting producers provides an out-
side shock. In this model, firms make 
real profits even if markets are perfect-
ly competitive and prices don’t change 
for a prolonged period. Mainstream 
theory predicts that when markets are 
perfectly competitive, producers can’t 
charge a high markup without losing 
customers. Rational inattention models 
predict that competitive producers, 
exploiting the limited ability of con-
sumers to process information about 
pricing, can make larger profits.
Brand-name products are a case 
in point. They are well advertised and, 
as a result, people may purchase them 
instead of often cheaper non-brand-
name competitors, though the items 
may be essentially the same with little 
difference to justify a premium price.
Making Policy Choices 
Whether rigid prices and wages 
occur because of market structure, 
such as monopolistic competition, 
or rational inattention has important 
policy implications. For instance, regu-
lation may address a monopolistic situ-
ation, limiting a firm’s market power. 
Conversely, if rigidities mainly arise 
from rational inattention, then efforts 
should be made to more actively com-
municate the direction of monetary 
policy.
Rational inattention also strongly 
affects policymakers’ communications 
strategies. Most obviously, the theory 
suggests that rationally inattentive peo-
ple make the most of available infor-
mation by analyzing those bits that are 
very relevant to their decisions and 
disregarding the rest. As a result, the 
public can make better decisions with 
better overall outcomes if policymakers 
are highly transparent about what they 
do and why.
Because rational inattention theory 
predicts that people pay attention to 
information according to their needs, 
people have little incentive to take 
note of economic bellwethers in times 
of stability. By contrast, in volatile peri-
ods, market participants will allocate 
more time analyzing current and future 
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result in more changeable behavior, 
including overreaction to news and 
policy changes.
Rational inattention implies that 
monetary policy instruments serve a 
dual role in the economy—as a stabi-
lizing and signaling device. The theory 
provides a solid framework to study 
the effects of the policy changes on 
private sector behavior by taking into 
account this double duty. 
An implication of this suggests 
that in troubled economic times, cen-
tral bankers must pay closer attention 
to their message. By contrast, in less 
stressful periods, difficult policy choic-
es can be made with less likelihood of 
market overreaction. 
In email parlance, it’s almost as if 
an important announcement has been 
diverted into a spam folder, where it 
may sit for a long time while attention 
is given to the daily flow of news and 
messages. The critical information is 
there but escapes detection and reac-
tion until much later, if at all.
Tutino is a research economist at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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